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(57) ABSTRACT 
A digital video camera includes an image sensor capable of 
producing a frame of video data representing an image 
viewed by the sensor, an image memory for storing video 
data such as previously recorded frame data in a video frame 
location of the image memory, a read circuit for fetching the 
previously recorded frame data, an encryption circuit having 
an encryption key input connected to receive the previously 
recorded frame data from the read circuit as an encryption 
key, an un-encrypted data input connected to receive the 
frame of video data from the image sensor and an encrypted 
data output port, and a write circuit for writing a frame of 
encrypted video data received from the encrypted data 
olrtput port of the encryption circuit to the memory and 
overwriting the video frame location storing the previously 
recorded frame data. 
12 Claims, 4 Drawing Sheets 
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ENCRYI'TING DIGIT.4L CAMERA WITH (presumably held at a safe location) correlating din'erent 
AUTOMATIC ENCRYPTION KEY 1)ELETION cameras with their different encryption keys for later decryp- 
tion of images received from various photographers. Thus, 
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION the ca~nera user must always consider the possibility that, 
j unbeknownst to him, the encryption key may have fallen 
Professional photographers make their livelihood by cap- into the wrong hands either through his negligence or that of 
luring valuable images of great interest that others have not his publisher (who must also have the same key or a related 
captured. Their financial reward often depends upon their key). This would compronlise all of the images taken with 
exclusive possession of those images. This requires care that the canlera during the life of the canlera. From the foregoing 
their images not fall into the hands of their competitors, for lo it can be seen that anotl~er disadvantage of an encrypting 
example, through theft of their camera or theft of the storage digital camera is that an elaborate set of precautionary 
illedium (e.g., a digital disk) on which the valuable images procedures must be employed in the administration of the 
have been stored. As one possible example, an electronic encryption key and any related keys. Mathematically related 
transmission via the internet of the photographer's valuable encryption keys capable of decrypting the same encrypted 
images from a remote location to his publisher ca l  be i s  data are often distinguished as "public" and "private" keys, 
intercepted by another publisher or competitor who then in which one is disseminated while the other is not. All such 
uses those images. In such a case, the value of the photog- schemes involve a significant risk that the key may be 
rapher's own images is reduced, since the images are no compromised at any time without the knowledge of the 
longer exclusively possessed or sold by his publisher. autl~orized users. 
AS another example, the photographer may have caught a 20 A fi~rther disadvantage of an encrypting digital camera is 
crilnillal on camera, and government authorities may con- that the presence inside the canlera of circuitry storing an 
fiscate the camera and storage media (film or disk) pursuant elaborate encryption key and related encrypting apparatus 
to a crinlinal investigation. In Such a case, file gOVernIllent a skilled thief in possession of camera that 
authorities liave no need to deal with the photographer, as any seemingly innocent noise present on the cmnera's 
they can develop or print the images tllemselves without 25 diskette or nlenlory ]nay achlal]y contain valuable video data 
assistance from the photographer. The authorities therefore retrievable via decryptioll, thus motivating the thief to 
need not return the camera or the fil~ddisk to the photog- search for the encryption key either in the camera or through 
rapher, regardless of the finallcia1 impact such a loss places another theft involving the encryption key administration 
on the photographer. documentation at the supposedly secure location. 
As a further exanlple, the photogra~ller may be an anla- 30 
~ h u s ,  it has not seemed practical or possible to inlplement 
teur who wislles to maintain his images in complete secrecy, a fool-proof encryptillg digita] 
and is therefore forced to take drastic steps to prevent any 
theft of his camera or its film or disk. SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION One possibility might be for the photographer to use a 
digital camera that captures each still image as video data, 
and to first encrypt the video data before storing or recording 
it on storage media (a removable diskette) in the camera. 
This would frustrate attempts to steal the images by copying 
them from the encrypted data. Thus, someone who steals the 
diskette or who intercepts a transmission (e.g., on the 
internet) of the encrypted image, would not be able to see the 
photographers' images. The photographer would ensure that 
his publisher possesses the encryption key used in the 
camera to encrypt the images as recorded on the camera 
diskette. The publisher would use the key to de-encrypt each 
of the received images. 
Such an approach is not practical. First, the digital camera 
would necessarily require circuitry to electrollically store the 
encryption key in a retrievable form and circuitry to-encrypt 
each block of video data with the encryption key. Secondly, 
theft of the camera would colnpro~nise the key, since the 
encyptioc circuitry within the cam- mustcontain or store 
the encryption key in order to hlction. Such a theft would 
therefore allow an unauthorized person possessing the cam- 
era and skilled in extracting the key from the canlera to 
decrypt the video data stored on the diskette (or any other 
video data recorded by that camera). Third, if the encryption 
key were coinpromised secretly by some other means not 
involving the camera (so that the camera continues to be 
used), every image ever encrypted and recorded by that 
camera, whether in the past or in the future, would be 
compromised. Many opportunities for stealing the encryp- 
tion key can arise. For example, generation of'tlle encryption 
key (e.g., by a random number generator) inust involve a 
number of persons, including those responsible for gener- 
ating keys, those who assign keys to certain cameras and 
load the keys tu the cameras, and a docu~lientatiu~l syste~ll 
A digital video canera includes a11 image se~isor capable 
of producing a frame of video data representing an image 
viewed by the sensor, an image memory for storing video 
data such as previously recorded frame data in a video frame 
location of said image memory, a read circuit for fetching 
the previously recorded frame data, an encryption circuit 
having an encryption lcey input connected to receive said 
previously recorded frame data from said read circuit as an 
encryption key, an un-encrypted data input connected to 
receive said frame of video data from said image sensor and 
an encrypted data output port, and a write circuit for writing 
a frame of encrypted video data received fro111 said 
encrypted data output port of said encryption circuit to said 
memory and ovenvriting the video frame location storing 
the previously recorded frame data. The previously recorded 
frame data that serves as an encryption key for the later 
recorded image can itself be an image or it can be a bit 
pattern, such as that produced, for example, by a random 
number generator. 
The write circuit in one embodiment can write said frame 
of encrypted video data to the frame location in said image 
memory of said previously recorded frame data, so that it 
overwrites the encryption key of said frame of encrypted 
video data upon the writing of said frame of encrypted video 
data to said memory. 
A docking station associated with the camera includes a 
decryption circuit having a decryption key input, and 
encrypted data input and decrypted data output, a decryption 
key memory having a memory output port connected to said 
decryption key input of said decryption circuit and a 
memory input port for receiving a decryption key to be 
stored in said decrypiion key memory. 
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A method of operatiug a digital video caulera haviug an key with which the encrypted images may later be 
image memory, includes filling said image memoly with a decrypted. The encryption key must be present in the camera 
first set of images, encrypting a second set of images and therefore if the caruera fills into unauthorized hands, the 
captured by said camera using respective ones of said first key could be comprolnised and all of the images stored in 
set of images as respective encryption keys, to produce an 5 the ulemory could be decrypted by unauthorized persons. 
encrypted version of said second set of images, and storing However, this probleni is overconle in the digital camera of 
the encrypted version of said second set of images in said FIG. 1.  This is because the encryption circuit 110 encrypts 
image memory by overwriting said first set of images. the video images with an encryption key in such a way that 
security of the images cannot be compronlised by a theft of 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS l o  the camera. Specifically, once an encrypted image has been 
stored in the memory 114, the encryption key for that image 
FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram of a digital video is no longer present in (or available from) the camera. 
camera enlbodying some aspects of the invention. Moreover, none of the electronic circuits within camera 100 
FIG. 2 is a flow diagram illustrating the operation of the such as the encryption circuit 110, the read circuit 116 or the 
camera of FIG. 1 .  15 write circuit 112 stores the encryption key, making the 
FIG. 3 is illustrates a truth table that cau be e~nployed in canera 100 a very silllple design allnost identical to a 
tlle encryption circuit of FIG. 2. conventional digital video camera, with the exception of the 
FIG. 4 is a schematic block diagram of a playback or encryption circuit 110. 
docking station for the camera of FIG. 1.  The manner in which the digital video camera 100 
FIG. 5 is a flow diagram illustrating one mode of oper- 20 encrypts and records video data without retaining an encryp- 
ating the docking station of FIG. 4 .  tion key is to use each "frame" location in the memory 114 
FIG, 6 is a flow diagram illustrating one method of (i.e., a location that can store data representing one video 
encrypting in accordance with a further aspect of the inven- frame) as a te~llporary storage location for an ellcryption key. 
tion. Prior to writing a current frame of video data to a current 
FIG. 7 illustrates the contents of the image memory at an 2 j frame location in tile nlenlory 114, the encryption key 
early point in the method of FIG. 6 .  previously stored in the current frame location is fetched by 
FIG. 8 illustrates the contents of the image memory at a the read circuit 116 and furnished to an encryptionkey input 
later point in the method of FIG. 6. port l lOa  of the encryption circuit 10. The current fame of 
video data from the image output circuit 108 is applied to an 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF TIIE 30 un-encrypted data input port 1lOb of the encryption circuit 
INVENTION 110, so that the current frame of video data is encrypted with 
the key and output at the encrypted data output port l lOc  of 
Referring now to FIG. 1 ,  a digital video camera 100 tlie encryption circuit 110. Then the encrypted frame of 
includes a lens assembly 102 that receives light from a scene video data is written to tlie current frame location in the 
to be photographed through a camera aperture 104. An 35 memory 114. This operation therefore overwrites the 
electronic light sensor 106, such as a charge coupled device encryption key previously stored in that melnory fame 
(CCD) array, converts the light from the scene to electroiric location. Thus, the mere act of encrypting and writing the 
impulses, which an image output circuit 108 converts to franle of video data to the memory 114 causes the corre- 
video data representing the image captured by the sensor sponding key to be overwritten so that it disappears from the 
106. The image is one video frame and represents all of the 40 lnenlory 114. This makes the camera 110 and memory 114 
picture elenlents (pixels) of the CCD array 106. Typically, completely secure and impervious to decryption by unau- 
the video data representing the video frame is arranged in thorized sources. A 1  of this requires, of course, that a copy 
plural blocks of serial data bits. An encryption circuit 110 of the encryption key previously recorded on the memory 
encrypts the video data from the image output circuit 108 in 114 be stored at a secure location so that the encrypted 
a manner to be described later in this specification. A write 45 images stored in the memory 114 can be retrieved later. 
circuit 112 causes the encrypted video data to be written to Another feature to further enhance security of the 
a high-speed lllenlory 114 via its data port 114a. The encrypted images is to record different encryption keys in 
memory may be an optical memory such as a re-writable the different lrlernory frame locations. 111 this way, the 
co~npact disk, or a re~llovable flash n~en~ory card, or a compromise of one encryption key co~npromises only a 
magnetic readlwrite system with a removable floppy disk. so single video frame stored in the Inenlory 114. Since a 
The camera 100 may have an optional capability of display- different encryption key is used to encrypt each of the 
ing video images sensed by the sensor106 or une~ryp ted  different images, the task facing a potential thief who must 
images previously recorded ia the melnory 114. (How crack a different encryption key for each different video 
unencrypted images can be recorded by the camera 100 will frame recorded in the menlory 114 is rendered nearly 
be described later in this specification.) In this case, a read 55 impossible. 
circuit 116 fetches video data from the memory 114 through Referring again to FIG. 1, the read circuit 116 fetches the 
the data port 114a and sends it to an output port 1OOa of the encryption key stored in a selected franle location in the 
camera. This data can be converted into an analog video memory 114 and fiimishes this key to the encryption circuit 
signal that can be displayed on an external video nlonitor. It 110. The image output circuit 108 provides the encryption 
should be noted that the camera 100 itself can include a 60 circuit 110 with one frame of video data representing a scene 
video monitor for viewing video images previously recorded viewed by the CCD array 106. The encryption circuit 110 
in the memory 114 or for viewing images as they are sensed co~nbines the frame of video data with the encryption key in 
in real time by the CCD array 106. accordance with an encryption process to prodnce an 
The purpose of the encryption circuit 110 is to prevent encrypted frame of video data. This encrypted frame of 
unauthorized access to the images stored in the nlernory 114. 6 5  video data is sent to the write circuit 112, which causes the 
An image sensed by the CCD array 106 is encrypted by the encrypted frame of video data to be written to the frame 
encryption by the encryption circuit 110 using an encryption location in lnernory 114 from which the encryption key was 
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last fetched by the read circuit 116. This ovel~vi-ites (oblit- port 1000 of the cainera 100 of FIG. 1. The conuection may 
erates) the encryption key that was used to encrypt the frame either be direct or via a remote communication link. The 
of video data. encryption keys (either images or data) recorded in the 
A progranxllcd controller circuit 150 coordi~lates the ~nernory 114 may be trans~nitted to the docking station 305, 
operation of the various entities of FIG. 1 to carry out the j where they are stored in a key inemory 310. The key 
foregoing operation, including tlie image output circuit 108, memory 310 may be a mass memory such as a hard disk 
the read circuit 116, the write circuit 112 and an address drive, and may filrther i~iclude a copying function for 
generator 155 of the rnelnory 114. Thus, the controller 150 transferring data to or from removable cainera l~ie~nories 
can be progralluned to time tlie transfer of one video fmme 114. By moving a switch 312 to the appropriate position, the 
to the encryption circuit 110 from the inlage output circuit 10 data downloaded to the port 305a is sent to the key memory 
108 witlithe selection of the appropriate memory address (or 310. Alternatively, if the caniera 100 or the removable 
address range) of the frame location in the menlory 114 niell~ory 114 and the docking station 305 are co-located, then 
containing the next encryption key to be used in encrypting the menlory 114 may be removed (be it a flash memory card 
the one video franle. The controller 150 enables the read or a disk) and inserted in a menlory reader port 315 of the 
circuit 116 to fetch the encryption key from thus lnenlory 15 docking station 305. In this case, the user can operate a 
frame location and provide it to the encryption circnit 110. switch 320 to cause the memory contents to be loaded from 
The coiitroller 150 enables the write circuit 112 to write the the Iiielnory reader port 315 to the key memory 310. The 
encrypted video frame to this same memory frame location, memory 114 is tlien taken away and re-inserted into the 
by causing the address generator 155 to issue the same camera 100, and the user can then take the camera 100 into 
address to the address port of tlie memory 114 during both 20 the field and begin taking pictures. 
the reading of the encryption key a id  the writing of the After the user has captured the desired images and stored 
encrypted image. them in the memory 114, they may be played back at the 
The foregoing operation is illustrated in FIG. 2. .4n iniage docking station 305. For this purpose, either the contents of 
represented by a franie of video data 210 is captured by the the memory 114 are transmitted over the remote link to the 
CCD array 106. The fralile of video data 210 is treated as a 25 download port 305a of the docking station, or the re~novahle 
stream of data bits organized as a sequence of data blocks memory 114 is taken from the camera and connected to the 
215 in the conventional manner. Conteniporaneously or menlory reader port 315 of the docking station 305. In either 
sin~ultaneously, an available frame location 220 in the case, a respective one of the switches 312, 320 nlust be 
llleniory 114 is selected and the read circuit 116 fetches an positioned so that the incoming data is directed to a decryp- 
encryption key 225 already stored in the frame looation 220. 30 tion circuit 340 rather than tlie key nienlory 310. The 
The encryption key 225 may be, for exanlple, a video image decryption circuit 340 receives the encrypted image (from 
previously recorded in the frame location 220, or it could be either tlie reader port 315 or from the download poit 305a) 
a bit pattern generated by a random number generator. It at its encrypted data input port 3400. The decryption circuit 
may have the same number of bits as a standard franie of 340 receives the appropriate encryption key (from the key 
video data. The data representing the encryption key 225 is 35 memory 310) at its decryption key input port 340b. The 
organized into a stream of data blocks 230 (corresponding to decryption circuit 340 then decrypts the image and outputs 
the sequence of data blocks 215 of the image to be it at a decrypted data output port 340c. The decrypted image 
encrypted) in the co~iventional manner. The encryption may then be recorded andor displayed on a video monitor. 
circuit 110 combines each bit in one block 215 with the If the encryption circuit 110 in the camera 100 is an XOR 
corresponding bit in the corresponding block 230 to produce 40 gate, then the decryption circuit 340 in the docking station 
an encrypted bit stream or encrypted frame of video data is also an XOR gate. 
235. The write circuit 112 then writes the encrypted frame of Tile caulera 100 of FIG. 1 is extremely versatile and can 
video data 235 to the same menlory frame location 220 from be employed in many modes. For example, the encryption 
which the encryption key 225 was fetched. keys stored in each melnory frame location may simply be 
The video data block buffer 215 and the video data block 45 the last set of encrypted images recorded in the memory 114. 
buffer 230 can be smaller than the size required to store one Thus, the sanie nlemory 114 or flash memory card or 
complete video frame, since each franie consists of many diskette may be re-used any number of times, each new set 
such blocks. For this purpose, the address generator 155 of images completely filling Ule memory 114. Tlien, the 
should have suficient resolutio~i to address sub-frame seg- images may be downloaded (via a remote con~niunication 
melit sizes. In addition, the output of tlie write circuit 112 to so link for example) to the docking station 305. The docking 
the memory 114 may have similar buffering, but tliis is not station 305 stores the received encrypted images as new 
il lust~te? in tlle drawi~g of FIG. 2. ~ ~ ~ ~ keys for decrypting the next set o f  @ages that may be 
In the illustration of FIG. 2, the encryption circuit 110 is received later as the memory 114 is reused. The docking 
depicted as an exclusive OR @OR) gate. However, other station 305 decrypts the received images for display or use. 
encryption processes may be e~nployed within the encryp- 5 5  Then, after tlie camera user ovenvrites the camera memory 
tion circuit 110 instead of or in addition to an XOR gate. One 114 with a complete new set of encrypted images and 
advantage of employing only an XOR encryption process is transmits these back to the docking station 305, the docking 
that the same encryption key used to encrypt tlie image will station decrypts the new images by using the previous set of 
also de-encrypt it perfectly. FIG. 3 illustrates tlie truth table received images as the encryptionldecryption keys. 
of the XOR gate 110 of FIG. 2. The coluniiis labeled "A", 60 This concept is illustrated. in FIG. 5. In FIG. 5, a succes- 
"B" and "C" in the table of FIG. 3 correspond to the inpnts sion of image sets (image sets A, B, C, etc.) from the camera 
"A" and "B" and output "C" of the XOR gate 110 of FIG. 100 are received at successive times by the docking station 
2. 305. Each image set car1 represent as many video images or 
Referring to FIG. 4, a docking station 305 may store a frames as required to fill the inelllory 114. Each image set is 
copy of the encryption keys stored in the camera memory 65 obtained by the carnera user over-writing images previously 
114. For this purpose, the docking station 305 has a down- recorded by the camera 100 on tlie memoty i i 4  with a 
load port 30% for co~ulectio~~ to the external video output complete new set of images. At the i~istallt in tilne depicted 
US 7,240,208 B1 
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in the snapshot of FIG. 5, image set A was received earlier zeroing out the nlenloly 114). These innocuous images (FIG. 
at the docking station 305, and now image set B has just 7) are furnished to the docking station 305 as encryption 
heen received, while image set C has yet to he received. keys for use in encrypting a subsequent set of images (step 
I lnag~  SCtA is used as the set of ellcryption keys to decrypt 620 oSFIG. 6). The controller 150 now conunands the write 
image set B by the decrypt circuit 340' For this Purpose, 5 process to begin at the "end" melnory frame locatio~l rather 
images 1,  2, 3, 4, etc., of i~llage set A are the keys used to than the "beginningn memory location (where the camera ilnages 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., of image set B. Later, after typica]ly begins recording at a first lnenlory frame location) 
image set C has beell received, illlage set B (the encrypted (step 630). .rhe camera user begins taking pictures, 
versiorl as is as the set wlich are ellcrypted as described above the previous 
decrypt image set C in the sane manner that image setA was 10 
as ellcryption keys (step 640 of FIG, 6), nese 
used earlier as the set of keys to decrypt image set B. The 
camera user should stop taking pictures at least by the time encrypted images are recorded in the memory 114 as 
canlera nlemory 114 becollles filll alld the described above, thus over-writing the previously recorded 
recorded encrypted froln the canlera lllelnory 114 to innocuous images. However, this over-writing is carried out 
the docking w]Gch lnay be at a remote (secure) 15 in reverse Order, beginning at the end Of memory Or 
location, Then the user may capture a new set of hages  with media (i.e., at an menlory location) and progressing 
the camera on the same nlemory 114. The object here is not toward "beginning" memory locatioll 650 of 
to re-use the lllelnory to save cost, but ratller, by 6). Tile definition of "beginning" and "end" memory loca- 
re-using the menlory, a unique llcryption key is automati- tions lllaY follow from conventiollal usage, in which a 
cally provided for each new image or video frame, and its 20 Of video francs are stored On Illedia in the 
association with that frame is conveyed in precise lnarwer to order in which they are captured begi~ltling at a low memoly 
the docking statioll based upon the trdllsmission of the address endillg at a lllemory address, althou@l 
previous set of illlages alld the assunlption that this definition may be reversed in some applications. The 
sequence images is always recorded in the same sequence e"c'~Pfed images ("1' "va"ab'e ~ich'res") ''lay not fill "1' 
of kame locations in the memory 114. 25 entire memory, so as to leave intact some of the innocuous 
While tile described embodiInents tile ellcryption u n e " c ~ ~ t e d  images at lhe "beginning" kame Ioca- 
key in the same lllelllory frme location ill wlech the image tions. As a result, upon confiscation of tlie camera and 
it encrypts is to be so encrypted image inspection by an unauthorized person, it would appear at first 
over-writes its key, other mallgelllellts may be enlp]oyed in glance that the lnemory is "Y partly irlnocuous 
carrying out the invention, For example, tile key that 30 images, at Ihe first memory location are 
ellcrypts one video frallle he written in a differellt easilY read 0' disPl'Yed by ordinary means, "1' '1'" a 
memory frame location than the one in which the encrypted portion of the memory Or media apparently 
video frame is written, although such a feature is not contains only indecipherable noise (as illustrated in FIG. 8), 
preferred, In ally case, the encryption key is over-written leading the unauthorized person to conclude that the latter 
contemporaneously when the encrypted image is recorded, 35 portion of the Or is unused and 
either slightly before, or siulultaneously with, or sliglltly contains no images, and furtl~ern~ore that the cainera 100 is 
after the encrypted image is recorded. The advantage an camera. 
remains therefore in all cases that the encryption key is A number of advantages can be Provided. For example, 
overwritten so that confiscation or theft of the canlera 100 or Of requires no special nlenlory dedicated 
removable memory 114 cannot compromise the encryption 40 to storing anencry~tionkey.Als0, a different e l lc ly~t ionke~ 
key. can be used for each encrypted image. Furthermore, once an 
It shou]d be re-emphasized that tile encryption key need ell~lypti0ll key is used, it is erased frornlnelnoty SO that theft 
not be a previous image recorded in the nlelllory of the canlera or of the removable menlory cannot compro- 
frame ]ocatioil, but instead be pure data, as a mise the key. Additionally, the camera requires no special 
randomly generated bit pattern. Moreover, the same enclyp- 45 encryption key, since the prior contents of the image 
tion key could be used for more than one image, although can serve as the elllcly~tion keys for the subse- 
such a feature is not preferred. This may be accomplished, quelltly recorded illlages. Thus, even tllough a different 
for example, by recording the same encryption key in e n c ~ ~ t i o n  key be used to ellcrypt the different inlages 
different melnory frame ]ocatiolls prior to use of the memory as they are captured by the camera, there is no requirement 
114 in the camera 100. 50 for a correspondingly large pre-existing set of encryption 
FIG. 6 illustrates a protocol that makes detection of the to acconlmodate all of the encrYPti0ll tasks. The only 
cclera  100 as an e~lcypting camera more difficult. First, the requirement is that each ~rel'ious set of nlemory contents be 
lnelnory is filled sequentially with a set of imlocuous images saved in-eotller-memory (e.g., a remote memory)~that can 
having no apparent value and which are unencrypted as be accessed later after the camera melnory has been over- 
recorded in tile nlenlory 114 s~ as to be or sj written. The contents can either be predetermined codes or 
viewable at a later time (e.g., via the read circuit 116) (step bit-patterns or they may be successive sets of images cap- 
610 of FIG. 6). Because of the presence of the encryption tured by the camera. 
circuit 110, if the camera 100 is used to capture and record While the invention has been described with respect to 
such innocuous images, then the media (memory 114) must embodiments in which each image that is encrypted is one 
coutain all zero bits in order for such innocuous images to 60 video frame, each video field (i.e., the odd or even field) of 
be readable (unencrypted). This mode would therefore be one frame could be encrypted separately, or, alternatively, 
preceded by a prelinlinary step (not indicated it1 FIG. 6) of each image could be only one video field. Furthermore, 
zeroiug out the media or lnelnory 114. Alternatively, the while the invention has been described with respect to ' 
removable memory 114 could be separately loaded with embodiments in which the same key is used to both encrypt 
such innocuous unencrypted iinages prior to being inserted 65 and decrypt an image, the ellcrypt key and the decrypt key 
in the camera i00 (in whiclt case it would not be necessary may instead be different but lnatiiematicaiiy related to one 
to take the special preliminary step referred to above of anuther,  sing cui~ventio~ial tecluiiques. 
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While the invention bas been described in detail by an image memory fbr storing a plurality of frames of data; 
specific reference to preferred embodiments, it is understood a read circuit for fetching one of the plurality of frames of 
that variations and ~nodifications there of niay be made data within said iiiiage memory; 
witliout departing fro111 the true spirit a11d scope of the an ellcryption circuit liavi~lg an ericryption key input 
invention. j co~ulected to receive said one of the plurality of frames 
What is claimed is: of data from said read circuit as an e~lcryptio~l key, a1 
1. A digital video camera systeni comprising: un-encrypted data input connected to receive said new 
a digital video camera comprising: frame of video data from said image sensor wherein 
an image sensor capable of producing a new frame of said new frame of video data is encrypted using the 
video data representing a11 inlage viewed by the lo  encryption key and an encrypted data output port; and 
sensor; a write circuit connected between said encrypted data 
an image menlory for storing a plurality of the frames output port and said memory wherein said write circuit 
of video data representing a plurality of images; overwrites tlie encryption key with the encrypted frame 
a read circuit for fetching one of the pluralities of the of video data. 
frames of video data from said image memory; 15 7. The digital video camera of claim 6 wherein said 
an encryption circuit having an encryption key input plurality of fralnes of data comprise video images previously 
connected to receive the one of the plurality of the caphired by said camera. 
frames of video data from said read circuit as an 8. The digital video camera of claim 6 wherein said 
encryption key, an un-encrypted data input con- plurality of frames of data cornprise predetermined frames 
nected to receive said new frame of video data from 20 of data not representing an unage. 
said image sensor wherein said new frame of video 9. A method of capturing images in a digital video canera 
data is encrypted using the encryption key, and an having an image sensor output circuit and an image nlemory 
encrypted data output port; and having plural frame locations for storing respective frames 
a write circuit for writing the frame of encrypted video of video data, comprising: 
data received from said encrypted data output port of 25 providing an encryption circuit in said camera; 
said encryption circuit to said image nmenlory and selecting a successive one of said frame locations in said 
overwriting said encryption key, wherein said image memory, and copying the contents thereof to an 
encryption key no longer resides in the image encryption key input of said encryption circuit; 
memory. capturing an image wit11 said cainera and transmitting a 
2. The digital video camera systern of claim 1 wherein the 30 frame of video data representing said image from said 
plurality of the frames of video data are transferred to a image sensor output circuit to an un-encrypted data 
decryption key memory, outside of the digital video camera, input of said encryption circuit, whereby said encryp- 
for use as a plurality of decryption keys, each of the plurality tion circuit encrypts said frame of video data using said 
of decryption keys comprising the fra~ne of video data col~tellts of the selected one of said frame locations as 
overwritten by the frame of encrypted video data. 3 a1 encryption key to produce an encrypted frame of 
3. The digital video camera system of claim 2 hrtller video data; 
comprising: writing said encrypted frame of video data to said image 
a docking station comprising: 111emory in the selected one of said frame locations to 
a decryption circuit llaving a decryption key input, and overwrite said encryption key, wherein said encryption 
encrypted data input and decrypted data output; 40 key no longer resides in the image memory. 
the decryption key liiernory having a memory output 10. Tlie method of claim 9 wherein the overwritten prior 
port connected to said decryption key input of said contents of said selected one of said frame locations com- 
decryption circuit and a lnemory input port for prises a decryption key for said encrypted frame of video 
receiving a decryption key to be stored in said data. 
decryption key memory. 45 11. The method of claim 9, wherein said selecting sel is 
4. The digital video canera system of clainl 3 wherein preceded by storing different initial frames of video data in 
said image memory comprises memory media that is relnov- different ones of said frame locations in said menlory prior 
able from said camera, and said docking station comprises to the step of capturing an image with said camera, whereby 
an image memory port into which said image memory is said initial fra~nes of video data ultimately serve as encryp- 
insertably connectable. so tion keys for images later captured by said camera. 
5. The digital video canlera systern of claim 4 further 12. The method of claim 9, wherein the selecting step is 
comprising switches for co~mecting said ilnage nlemory port preceded by stori~ig different bit patterns jn difierent ones of 
alternatively to said encrypted data input of said decryption said frame locations in said memory prior to the step of 
circuit and to said me~nory u~put port of said decryption key capturing an image with said camera, whereby said bit 
memory. 55 patterns ultilnately serve as encryption keys for images later 
6. A digital video camera comprising: captured by said camera. 
an image sensor capable of producing a new frame of 
video data representing an image viewed by the sensor; * * + * * 
